In doing so, fidelity to the principle of "economy of force" should be maintained, so as not to undermine the primary attack on Iraq's strategic center of gravity -Saddam and his regime. 
Taking on these terrorist groups before termination of hostilities could preserve freedom of action, shore up the fledgling Iraqi government, and potentially speed the redeployment of U.S.
forces. Coalition forces should target the enemy's critical vulnerabilities by denying their hold on territory, freedom of movement, access to resources and recruits, the survivability of forces, and command, control, communication, computers, and intelligence (C4I), More than just joint or combined, these efforts would entail broad interagency coordination, with all tools of intelligence, diplomacy, law enforcement, economic policy and information -as well as military -are brought to bear.
In doing so, fidelity to the principle of "economy of force" should be maintained, so as not to undermine the primary attack on Iraq's strategic center of gravity -Saddam and his regime. should war with Iraq come to pass -it will be insufficient just to remove Saddam and destroy his weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The United States government appears committed to ensuring that the new regime is representative and able to offer its people order and prosperity.2 It follows then that new sources of threats, not just the old regime, must be neutralized to create the necessary conditions for achieving this strategic goal. One such threat is the presence of terrorist groups in Iraq.
The Republican Guard, WMD, SCUD missiles, and oil facilities are decisive points on the path to the Iraqi strategic center of gravity, namely Saddam and his regime. Given the number of objectives, a combatant commander could be forgiven for wanting to postpone until the post¬ hostilities phase an additional decisive point not directly tied to the Iraqi center of gravity -namely terrorist cells resident in Iraq.
However, I would argue that the degradation or destruction of these terrorist organizations comprises a key conflict-termination objective and, thus, should be conducted simultaneously or, at the very least, in tight sequential order, prior to the end of hostilities.
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Supporting this thesis are the following arguments: First, there are terrorist entities in Iraq that pose a threat to our forces, as well as a new regime; second, existing terrorist groups have the potential to attract, assist, or galvanize disaffected elements -be they Saddam's loyalists, Islamic extremists, or Iran and other neighbors; third, attacking these elements simultaneous or in tight sequential fashion to the primary effort would offer U.S. forces relative freedom of action, could help stabilize the new regime, and should speed the redeployment of U.S. forces; fourth, in defeating terrorist organizations, possible lines of attack include the denial and disruption of territory, movement, resources, recruits, and C4I,3 as well as the attrition and annihilation of forces; finally, these objectives can be pursued through joint, combined, and interagency applications, giving due regard for the uniqueness of each challenge and the need for economy of force.
II. Terrorist Groups in Iraq
Much ink has been spilled following the attacks of September 11th refuting the tie between Islamic Radicals: Given al Qaeda 's presence in over 60 countries and even factoring in conservative estimates of its ties with Baghdad, there is every reason to believe that al Qaeda will be offering resources and manpower to militant Sunni Islamic elements opposing the U.S. presence and a presumably secular new government in Baghdad. Moreover, the growing realization that Ansar al-Islam is a genuine terrorist organization that commands militants and controls territory has also increased the fear that al Qaeda could have an entree into Iraq.22 Sunni Imams interested in profiling themselves among the inevitable body of disgruntled citizenry will inevitably be tempted to contribute their services to such a radical body. Donors from the ultra-conservative Wahhabi sect in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States might be inclined to support militant groups, particularly if a secular government in Baghdad is perceived as too closely linked with the West.
In the south, Shi'a radicals might coalesce behind an organization that attacks American interests or the new government, particularly if they perceive the new government to be insufficiently Shi'ite or Islamic. The U.S, and UK have worked with the two main Shi'a bodies, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and al Dawa, While neither has expressed overt hostility to the U.S. -indeed, both hope to use an American-led invasion to further their influence -it is conceivable that whichever group is on the losing side of a potential regimechange power play may resort to violence. continue to control even small areas of territory is the extent to which coalition forces will remain vulnerable and opponents of a U.S.-led operation will be afforded opportunities to destabilizing it, particularly in the event that they acquire weapons of mass destruction. At the core, the military end state -those military conditions that are needed before the conflict can be safely concludedcannot be achieved until all terrorist entities in Iraq are neutralized.
Among the compelling reasons why it is preferable to address these terrorist cells during, rather than following, hostilities, are these three: • Shoring up the new Iraqi regime: Diminishing the terror threat prior to the installation of an interim Iraqi government would permit this regime and aid workers to concentrate on immediate reconstruction. Prolonged counterterrorism operations could cast a negative light on the effectiveness of the new government, undermine donor and investor confidence, and mobilize potential opposition from broader sectors of the society.
• Speeding redeployment of U.S. forces: Nipping in the bud potential terrorist or insurgent movements in Iraq would shorten the amount of time necessary for the new regime to secure its territory, which would in turn allow the U.S. and its coalition partners to draw down manpower in theater at an earlier date.
V. Lines of Attack toward Defeating Terrorist Organizations
During his September 20, 2001 address to Congress, President Bush declared that the United States: "... will direct every resource at our command -every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war -to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network."31
As the combatant commander draws up his operational plan, he should be mindful that the available counterterrorism tools are not just military, but diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, economic, and informational. Indeed, ideally one deploys a combination of two or more. While 13 the non-military tools are well elaborated in the literature, more seems to have been written on how the military should not be used, rather than how it should.32 Fundamentally, as with a conventional enemy, there are for every terrorist organization certain "critical factors" which enable it to function. Some of these critical factors are likewise critical vulnerabilities, which can serve as objectives on the road to destroying the enemy's center of gravity.
A terrorist organization's critical factors may be its 1) territory controlled; 2) freedom of movement; 3) financial and materiel resources; 4) recruits and supporters; 5) command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I); and 6) ability to mass. While an attack on any one of these would probably not suffice in defeating an enemy terror group, success in all or most areas almost certainly should. Indeed, all tools of counterterrorism should be utilized as a layered approach, never completely divorced from each other.33
• Denial of Territory: One of the sources of al Qaeda's strengths is its diffused global network, made possible by its sophisticated use of computer communications, transportation, and low-visibility financial networks, such as the "hawala " system of transnational moneychangers. That said, it would be an exaggeration to assert that al Qaeda is a 'Virtual" terrorist group with no need for a geographic haven.
The loss of Afghanistan as a training area, staging area, and sanctuary for al Qaeda did not defeat the organization, but it appears to have degraded it capabilities. Mullah 14 Omar and a cadre of Taliban diehards are rumored to remain in the highlands of Oruzgon Province, but the greater threat appears to stem from areas adjacent to Pakistan's frontier provinces. In Iraq, groups such as Ansar al-Islam can also profit from a nearby safe-haven that is inaccessible to U.S. forces. Still, the group should not be allowed to have control of any villages prior to the end of the military phase of operations, for the reasons cited above.
One note: Such counter-terror operations could be the most fruitful avenue of combined U.S.-Kurdish insurgent operations, given that the Peshmerga might not be a match for Saddam's regular forces.
• Denial of Movement: Possibly a terrorist organization's most formidable critical strength, movement and maneuver can be very difficult to degrade. As Operation Anaconda exemplified, it is exceedingly difficult to sever the escape routes of terrorists who blend in.
Likewise, small cells operating in urban or rural environments can easily avoid detection, absent good intelligence sources. In Iraq it will be vital to control access at airports and major border crossings and to cordon off known areas of terrorist concentration.
• Denial of Resources: "Money is like oxygen to terrorists, and it must be choked off."34
Other branches of the U.S. government have foremost responsibility for enforcing financial restrictions on foreign terrorist entities, but the combatant commander will need to ensure that financial institutions within Iraq are in frill compliance. Materiel resources are also key to a terrorist organization's operations and coalition forces will need to cut off all * Audrey Kurth Cronin, ed., The Diplomacy of Counterterrorism: Lessons Learned, Ignored, and Disputed government can muster, and this entails both the minimilization of collateral damage during hostilities and the installation of a just regime afterward.36 While there may always be a "core of incorrigibles"37 that may never abandon the fight, new recruits are motivated by momentum. "Fewer people are willing to risk their lives for an apparently losing cause than will do so in the vanguard of a movement with a future."38 The key here is to exercise the principle of the "offensive" and the concepts of "continuity" in order to ensure that coalition forces retain the momentum.
• Disruption of C4I: Tactics like decapitation, division, dislocation, and infiltration are historically very effective, and very difficult, means to disrupt the C4I of a terrorist organization. Examples of a severed C4I drastically impairing an entity include the decline in power of Shining Path, the Kurdish PKK, and the German Red Army Faction following the arrests of their leadership. There is not always "someone else" to replace a fallen leader. Likewise, the mere act of disrupting terrorist operations can win the U.S. important forces can isolate parts of terrorist cells from the C4I, they can imprison or kill terrorist leaders, or they can utilize friendly Iraqis to infiltrate these organizations, provided there is sufficient time.
• Attrition & Annihilation of Forces: The most directly military approach to counter¬ terrorism operations is the attrition of armed militants, when one is fortunate enough to find them massed. To the extent that terrorist organizations are able to occupy territory, they are more likely to organize paramilitary units to maintain the occupation. If such paramilitaries mass in order to conduct conventional operations, they are susceptible to annihilating attacks by massed coalition forces, as in northern Afghanistan. Once massed forces are located and attacked, a key follow-on effort will be to keep them on the run In pursuing the above objectives, the combatant commander has with his joint and combined forces, as well as through the interagency process, access to all counterterrorism tools. should not be brushed over. The bottom line for these groups is that the United States should not stoke antagonisms where they do not exist, but should immediately quash any that arise.
For more sedentary terrorist organizations resident in Iraq, such as the PLF and the rump Abu Nidal, the "joint" nature of the combatant commander's responsibilities would be supplanted by a broader interagency process, as law enforcement and intelligence play the forward role, supported only rarely by ground and air forces. While the command relationship in this interagency paradigm may not be delineated vertically from the commander's headquarters, interagency coordination must be tight.
Finally, for all such secondary operations, the combatant commander must employ "economy of force," that principle of warfare described by Clausewitz as ensuring "that no part of College, 2001 ). An interesting analysis of how operational art applies to counterterrorism operations. the force is idle,"43 and by the Doctrine for Joint Operations as the allocation of, "minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts."44 The governing principle is that no asset critical for the primary objective should be drawn away for a secondary objective.
VII. Recommendations
From open-source information on Iraq, as well as recent experience in Operation Enduring
Freedom and other counterterrorist operations, we can draw the following recommendations:
1. Regardless of whether terrorist organizations are separate from or part of Saddam's power base, they comprise a "threat in being" to American troops and any new government we support. If a combatant commander wishes to create the military conditions necessary to achieve America's strategic goals, defeating the enemy's center of gravity is not the only critical war termination objective.
2. Disenchanted elements -be they Saddam's loyalists, militant Islamists, agents of regional states, or jealous friendly international partners -will look for avenues to exert influence and potentially undermine any possible government we help take power. The fewer such hostile groups we allow to operate freely at the end of hostilities, the fewer the tools these problematic elements will have to undermine the stability of the new order.
3. Conducting counterterrorism operations during hostilities affords U.S. forces greater freedom of action, decreases the vulnerability for a new pro-Western Iraqi regime, and 43 Clausewitz, 213 
